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Abstract
At ports of entry, radiation detectors could be mounted on container gantry crane spreaders to monitor
cargo containers entering and leaving the country. These detectors would have to withstand the extreme
physical conditions experienced by these spreaders during normal operations. Physical shock data from
the gable ends of a spreader were recorded during the loading and unloading of a cargo ship by two hard
mounted PCB Piezotronics model 340A50 accelerometers and two Lansmont SAVER 9X30 units (with
padding). The majority of large shocks were observed in the vertical direction. The Lansmont units
recorded mean shocks of 22.215 ± 1.174 and 23.776 ± 1.140 g, while the PCB accelerometers recorded
mean shocks of 31.608 ± 1.798 and 37.072 ± 2.015 g in this direction. Maximum shocks were as high
as 118.854 g. A scatter plot of observed peak acceleration versus velocity change is presented to allow
comparison with the damage boundary curve for any planned instrumentation for future systems. It is
hoped that the results of this research will aid in the design of future crane-mounted systems.

I.

Introduction

The SAFE Port Act requires that all containers entering the US through its 22 busiest ports be monitored
for radiation [1]. Monitoring cargo for nuclear materials is essential for border security and nonproliferation efforts [2, 3]. To provide better radiation detection coverage on cargo containers, some
companies have investigated the use of detection systems directly mounted to ship-to-shore container
gantry cranes [2–4]. These spreaders weigh in excess of 15 tons and routinely collide with shipping
containers and other objects at operating speeds during their day-to-day operations. Mounting radiation
detectors on this type of crane would put the sensors in the closest possible proximity to cargo containers
while minimizing background radiation contributions but these systems would undergo large amounts of
physical stress during loading and off-loading operations [2]. Many radiation detectors are known to be
susceptible to mechanical shock; NaI(Tl) scintillators, for example, are relatively brittle and fragile [5–7].
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Figure 1. Ship-to-Shore Container Gantry Crane, Port of Tacoma, Husky Terminal

Figure 1. Container Crane Spreader

The Spreader Bar Radiation Detector project was a joint effort of Sandia National Laboratories and
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Agency’s (NNSA)
Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. Researchers in Texas A&M University’s Nuclear Security
Science and Policy Institute assisted in this work by collecting physical shock data using two different
types of accelerometers at the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s Test Track Facility at the Port of
Tacoma’s Husky Terminal (Figure 1) during normal operations. It is hoped that the results of this research
will aid in the design of future crane-mounted systems.
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System design for these conditions can be improved with direct observation of the physical shocks
experienced by the spreader. Damage boundary theory is a testing protocol which determines which
shock inputs will damage a product [8]. A combination of the acceleration level and velocity change, due
to a shock, can cause product damage; however, there is a critical acceleration and critical velocity
change, and both must be exceeded for damage to occur. A theoretical boundary damage curve can be
seen in Figure 3. The shock environment of the spreader bar can be measured in advance for evaluation
against the damage boundary curve for any proposed future instrumentation.

Figure 3. Theoretical damage boundary curve caused by a square waveform with arbitrary scaling. Product damage only
occurs in the shaded region. A shock input above both the critical acceleration (AC) and critical velocity change (∆VC) will
cause damage.

II.

Materials and Methods

To measure physical shock, two self-contained accelerometer units were fabricated at Sandia National
Laboratory, each consisting of a Lansmont SAVER 9X30 accelerometer/data recorder and a PCB
Piezotronics Model 340A50 tri-axial accelerometer within an aluminum housing. The PCB accelerometer
was attached directly to the aluminum housing while the Lansmont accelerometer was braced in the case
by high-density polyethylene foam (Figures 4 &5). The data from both accelerometers were stored by the
Lansmont accelerometer. The Lansmont and PCB accelerometers were designated “internal” and
“external” respectively, in accordance with their mounting location in the housing. The PCB
accelerometers were previously calibrated by Sandia’s Primary Standards Lab and were in calibration
during data collection. Calibration was checked on November 11, 2013 and found to be within
specification. The Lansmont accelerometers were calibrated by the manufacturer. Sandia preformed a
subsequent shock table test which showed very good agreement between the Lansmont accelerometer and
the reference accelerometer.
Both units were attached to the gable ends of a spreader bar located at the Port of Tacoma’s Husky
Terminal. The final placement of the units was decided by the Port of Tacoma; the resulting orientation
aligned the x-axis perpendicular to the docks surface (i.e. up/down), the y-axis perpendicular to the ship
(lateral movement of the crane), and the z-axis parallel to the length of the ship. One unit was mounted on
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the landside of one gable end, and the other was mounted on the waterside portion of the opposite gable
end, as shown in Figure 6.
Shock and vibration data were recorded over the unloading and loading of one ship. Data were stored
internally, on separate channels for each axis of motion, and periodically transferred to a laptop. Both
PCB accelerometers experienced mechanical and electrical faults, primarily on the Z axis channel; data
from this channel were not included in analysis. Mechanically, mount loosening permitted the
accelerometer to slide, resulting in large artificial accelerations. Electronically, the interface connectors
repeatedly came loose, generating false signals with decay times of 1 to 10 seconds due to the open circuit
input. The false data from these records were not included in analysis.

Figure 4. Lansmont SAVER 9X30 and Piezotronics Model 340A50
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Figure 5. The land-side (A) and water-side (B) accelerometers shown in their housing, mounted on the bracket attached to
the spreader bar. The axial orientations are circled in red.

Figure 6. Rendering of the spreader showing placement of the landside and waterside detectors.

Data were transferred from the units to the laptop during regularly scheduled breaks in the loading and
unloading of the ships. Data were collected beginning with the 8 AM shift on 19 March, 2012 and ending
after the night shift, just before 8 AM on 21 March, 2012. Transfers to the laptop occurred just after 12:00
and 17:00 (lunch break and shift change) on 19 March and 20 March. The last transfer was completed
after the ship was fully loaded at approximately 09:20 on 21 March, 2012. The data were exported as
Comma Separated Values (CSV) files for further data analysis.

III. Results & Discussion
The data were obtained over two days of unloading and loading the ship. The accelerometers stored shock
and vibration data internally, on separate channels for each axis of motion, until it was transferred to the
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laptop with a USB connection. All units recorded severe physical shocks during the operation period. The
z-axis shock data from the PCB accelerometers were neglected due to electronic and mechanical
malfunctions. Additionally, it was observed that loose electronic connections created irregular spikes with
decay times from 1 to 10 seconds. The false data from these records were removed from analysis. The
shock and vibration data were plotted with respect to time using the SaverXware from Lansmont. A
sample shock time history from the Landside unit on 20:29:34 19 March, 2012 (signal 131) is reproduced
Figure 7.
The initial shock event occurs at ~40 ms. A large acceleration is detected on both the internal and external
accelerometers. The primary shock is along the x axis, registering 38.48 g and 19.59 g on the external and
internal accelerometers respectively. After ~20 ms and 60 ms, small aftershocks occur in alternating
directions. Much smaller accelerations are simultaneously observed on the Y axis channels (peak 3.40 g
internal and 7.28 g external) and the Z axis (peak 2.86 g internal). The largest accelerations were on the
external (unpadded PCB) accelerometer. In general, the external accelerometer recorded sharp peak
accelerations with shorter durations while the internal accelerometer recorded round lower peak
accelerations with longer durations. This results in typically lower ∆V values for the external
accelerometers. In this case, the internal accelerometer measured ∆V values of 57.91 and 5.39 [in s-1] for
the X and Y axes versus 41.28 and 3.05 [in s-1 ] on the external. It is suspected that lower peak
accelerations and rounder peak shape of the internal accelerometer is due to the padding presence of the
small amount of polyethylene foam. The time history behavior of this shock is typical of the recorded
data.

Figure 7: Sample shock time history from the Landside unit on 20:29:34 19 March, 20012 (signal 131). The data from all
channels are plotted together and then separated and scaled by axis. The primary shock is along the X axis but smaller
magnitude accelerations are also observed on the Y and Z axes.

A total of 476 shock events were recorded for the landside units while only 376 events were recorded for
the waterside units. Due to the faulty electrical connections, the sample sizes for external accelerometers
are smaller than the internal accelerometers. For all units, the data are right skewed due to the high
outlying maximums. Histograms of the acceleration data from each unit are shown in Figure 8. A
summary of the relevant statistics for the total data set is included in Table 1.
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Several trends should be highlighted. First, the data are clearly non-Gaussian and right skewed with a
large spread in the data across all channels. Additionally, in all units the majority of large shocks occurred
along the X axis (vertical motion) resulting in the highest mean and maximum shocks in these channels.
The mean shock values along the X axis are ~3 times those on the respective Y axis (perpendicular to the
ship) for each detector. For the internal detectors, the mean X axis shock value is ~6 times the respective
mean shock on the Z axis (parallel to ship). The maximum observed shock for each unit is along its X
axis and is significantly larger than the maximum in any other direction. Both the internal detectors
reported low maximum and mean values for shocks along the Z axis. During this study, this direction was
relatively sheltered from mechanical shocks. If a proposed instrument has a weak axis that is more
vulnerable to shock, such as the joint between the photo-multiplier tube and a scintillation crystal, it
should be aligned in this direction to minimize the potential for damage.
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Figure 8. Histograms of the recorded shock data for each accelerometer by axis.

Table 1: Summary statistics of the recorded data.

Accelerometer
Channel
Landside Int. X
Landside Int. Y
Landside Int. Z
Landside Ext. X
Landside Ext. Y
Waterside Int. X
Waterside Int. Y
Waterside Int. Z
Waterside Ext. X
Waterside Ext. Y

Sample Standard Skew
Size
Deviation
476
13.071
1.268
476
_6.600
3.516
476
_1.977
1.558
453
19.523
1.080
415
_9.449
2.416
376
11.279
1.744
376
_7.375
4.403
376
_2.267
1.205
326
15.566
0.782
319
_7.128
2.521

Mean [g]
95% Confidence
22.215 ± 1.174
_7.507 ± 0.593
_3.711 ± 0.178
31.608 ± 1.798
_8.255 ± 0.912
23.776 ± 1.140
_7.375 ± 0.745
_4.476 ± 0.229
37.072 ± 2.015
11.259 ± 0.782

Median Maximum
[g]
[g]
19.940
_79.797
_5.908
_57.941
_3.204
_14.740
27.246
111.231
_5.817
_64.661
22.991
_98.749
_5.618
_60.059
_3.915
_13.477
35.538
118.854
_9.656
_64.086

It is noted that the external accelerometers recorded larger mean and maximum shocks than the internal
detectors with a greater spread in the data. It is unclear if this variance is due to differences in function
between the accelerometer models used or a result of the padding used on the internal accelerometers.
Additionally, the landside accelerometers show slightly more variance than the waterside ones. Despite
this, the waterside units reported the largest maximum shock for both the internal and external
accelerometers. However, peak acceleration alone will not cause damage; a sufficient velocity change,
from a shock, must also occur. There is a critical acceleration and critical velocity change, and both must
be exceeded for damage to result. The critical acceleration and critical velocity change required to cause
damage will be instrument dependent. For example, Saint Gobian rates its 2” X 18”NaI(Tl) detectors for
maximum shocks of 5g’s at 10 ms in any direction while its PolyScin® NaI(Tl) are rated for 200g’s at 5
ms. To aid in future instrumentation selection, a cumulative scatterplot of the observed peak
accelerations and corresponding ∆V is provided in Figure 9, along with scaled plots of each axis for
comparison with product damage boundary curves.
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Figure 9: Peak acceleration [g] versus velocity change [in s-1]. Landside values are plotted as + ; Waterside values as . A
cumulative data set and scaled plot for each axis is presented.

A few key observations can be made from these plots. First, the highest accelerations and ∆V values are
observed along the X axis, while the lowest are observed along the Z axis. When designing a system, the
weakest axis should be aligned parallel to the length of dock to minimize the possibility of damage.
Additionally, there is not a significant difference between the maximum events for the landside and
waterside units, though there is a noticeable difference between the external and internal accelerometers.
The unpadded external accelerometers show higher shocks with lower velocity changes, while the padded
internal accelerometers show lower peak shocks with larger velocity changes. This is believed to be due
to small amounts of polyethylene padding present around the internal units, as the function of padding is
to translate high acceleration events outside the packaging to lower acceleration events for the internal
object. Any system designed to operate in these environments must be able to limit input accelerations
below critical accelerations levels. Low Z padding is the suggested method to minimize attenuation and
preserve detector sensitivity.

IV. Conclusions
This work shows that detection systems mounted on the gable ends of a spreader will operate in an
extreme shock environment. During loading and unloading shifts, crane operators are mainly concerned
with working as quickly as possible and will not slow down for fragile systems. The largest peak
accelerations and most potentially damaging events were observed along the vertical axis. The slightly
padded Lansmont units recorded mean shocks of 22.215 ± 1.174 and 23.776 ± 1.140 g’s with
maximum shocks of 79.797 and 98.749 g’s in this direction; the hard-mounted PCB accelerometers
recorded mean shocks of 31.608 ± 1.798 and 37.072 ± 2.015 g’s with maximum shocks of 111.231 and
118.854 g’s. The lowest peak accelerations and least potentially damaging events were observed parallel
to the dock. A scatterplot of the observed peak accelerations and corresponding ∆V in the environment is
presented to aid instrumentation selection for future systems. Systems should be designed to withstand
maximum shock inputs of over 120 g’s in the vertical direction, over 60g’s in the lateral direction of the
crane, and 20 g’s parallel to the dock, or sufficiently cushioned to lower received internal accelerations to
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acceptable levels for a given instrument. Low-Z padding is suggested to stabilize the detector and protect
it from large shocks while not overly inhibiting the detection mechanisms.
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